Abstract -The coding theorem is proved for the secret sharing communication system (SSCS) with two noisy channels, each of which is a broadcast channel characterized by P( y,z, Ix,), j = 1,2; it is assumed that the legitimate channel ( Xj + Y,) is less noisy than the wiretapped channel ( Xj
I. INTRODUCTION T 0 ATTAIN safe information transmission via several parallel channels, the secret sharing communication system (SSCS) [l] has been studied as an extension of both Shannon's cipher system [2] and the secret sharing system [3] . The coding theorem was proved for the SSCS with two or three channels in [l] , but the channels were assumed to be noiseless. In this paper the SSCS with two noisy channels (shown in Fig. 1 ) is considered. The specifications of the system are as follows. The source S is a finite memoryless source. The information S must be transmitted to the legitimate receiver without errors via two noisy channels (BCCl and BCC2) . Because unauthorized persons may eavesdrop on the information S via the noisy channel, the information S must be kept as secret from them as possible. Each noisy channel can be regarded as a discrete memoryless broadcast channel (BCC) P(yjzj]xj), j =1,2 (shown in Fig. 2 ), which consists of a mam channel ( Xj + 5) and a wiretapped channel (Xi + Zj). We assume for simplicity that each main channel is less noisy than each wiretapped channel, respectively. The relation "Channel ( Xj + Yj) is less noisy than channel ( Xj + Zj)" means that for every random variable forming a Markov chain y. + Xj + YjZj, the following inequality holds: I(?; 5) >I&;.; z,) (see [4] for details on the notion of "less noisy"). Manuscript received February 15, 1988; revised July 18, 1988 . This paper was presented in part at the IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, Kobe, Japan, June 1988.
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To realize a secure transmission in this system, we use a block code. Since the two channels do not have the same characteristics in general, a different codeword length is used for each BCC (say Ni and N2 for BCCl and BCC2, respectively) per K source output symbols. The encoder J can utilize an arbitrary random number T besides the source output SK to randomize the codewords XF = (X11, x1*,* * -7 XtN,) and X7 = ( X2i, Xz2,. . . , X,,). Since T can be chosen arbitrarily, the encoder f can be restricted to deterministic functions without loss of generality. Hence XT and Xp can be assumed to be uniquely determined from both SK and T by the encoder f. The decoder reproduces s^" from both I';" and Y;"2. The security level of this system is measured by ((l/K)H(SK]ZF), (wwvKIZ29).
In this paper the coding theorem for the foregoing system is proved, and the admissible region of rates and security levels is completely obtained. The precise statement of the problem and the main results are given in 001%9448/89/0500-0572$01.00 01989 IEEE Main Channel *
Section II. The theorem is proved in Section III. A binary example is given in Section IV. The SSCS with two noisy channels was discussed earlier as a generalization of the SSCS with two noiseless channels. However (see Fig. l ), if only one channel is considered, the system reduces to the wiretap channel system, studied by Wyner [5] and extended by CsiszLr and Kiirner [4] . Hence the SSCS with two noisy channels can be regarded as an extension of the concept of the wiretap channel. The relation of our results' to previously known ones [l] , [4] , [5] is examined in Section II.
II. FORMAL~TATEMENTOFTHE~ROBLEMAND MAIN RESULTS
Let the source output { S, }r=i be a sequence of independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables (Rv's), S taking values in a finite discrete set 9'. Each channel in Fig. 1 is a broadcast channel (shown in Fig. 2 ) characterized by P(yjzjlxj), xi E Xi., yj E gj;., zj E Tj (j = 1,2) where Tj, gj, Tj are finite discrete sets. The BCC has the property that the main channel ( Xj -+ 5) is less noisy than the wiretapped channel ( Xj + Z,). The code (f,+) is defined by two mappings:
s"K= 'p( Y;y, Y;"z)
where T is a random number and takes values in a discrete finite set .9-. T and .7 can be chosen arbitrarily. The rate of each channel is given by N,./K. The decoding error of the legitimate receiver can be evaluated by E(l/K)D, (SK,gK) where D, is the Hamming distance function while the security level of SK for each eavesdropper can be evaluated by (l/K)H(SKIZj?).
Definition 1:' (R,, R,, h,, h2) is admissible for the SSCS shown in Fig. 1 if a code (f, +) and a random number T exist such that for any given 6 > 0 and K sufficiently large,
E;DH(SK,$(Yp,Y;\iZ)) 16.
Definition 2: The admissible region 9?)sscs is defined by .%? sscs p {(R,, R,, h,, h,): (R,, R,, h,, h2) is admissible}. 
Proof: Equations (ll)- (13) can be rewritten as follows:
Hence if (R,, R,, h,, h,) satisfies (ll)- (13) it also satisfies (14)- (16). On the other hand, if (R,, R,, h,, h2) satisfies (14)- (16) it also satisfies (ll)-(13) with rj = I( Xj; Y,)R,.
The secrecy capacity or secrecy capacity region can be defined when the information can be sent to the legitimate receiver in perfect secrecy (cf.
[4], [5] ). In the SSCS with two BCC's, the information SK can be kept secret from each eavesdropper perfectly if h, = h, = H(S). Hence we define the secrecy capacity region 9's",,, as follows: 92,s g { (4, R,): (4, R,> H(S), H(S)) E us,,,}.
We can then easily obtain the following corollary. Corollqy 2: Under the same condition as in Theorem 1, (RI, Rd E -@',",a if and only if there exist RV's Xj, Y,, ZJ (j = 1,2) such that
We now investigate the special cases of Fig. 1 . In the case that the eavesdropper can obtain the same information as the legitimate receiver, the admissible region reduces to 
by substituting Zj = 5 (j =1,2) in (14)-(16). In the case in which the two channels are noiseless, we can obtain the admissible region by letting Xj = 5 = Zj (j = 1,2) as follows:
The region (26)- (28) coincides with the admissible region of the SSCS with two noiseless channels [l] . Furthermore, we note from (23)- (25) that the admissible region in the case Yj = Zj can be achieved by concatenating the usual error correcting code and the code for the SSCS with two noiseless channels.
In the case that only one channel is available, say BCCl, we get the admissible region by substituting R, = 0 and h, = H(S) in (14)- (16) 
where co--f 0 as f -+ 0. Combining (31) and (32), the following inequality holds: 
'In [4], the rate is defined as R, = K/N, as opposed to R, = N,/K in this paper.
*In this section superscripts on vectors are omitted for simplicity. We now define rj ( j = 1,2) by Krj 2 I(ST; 5).
Then from (33) we get
rI+r2k~[H(S)+Z(T;Y,Y,lS)-Kt,]
OH;-+ (39 Furthermore, the following inequality can be obtained from ( 
where q-l= (f&Y y22,-* -9 r,,-I), g;+l= (Z2r+l,Z2r+2,"',z2N2), and the last equality follows from [4, lemma 71.
To simplify (36) 
Then ( 
Since the main channel ( Xj + rj) is less noisy than the wiretapped channel ( Xj -+ Zj), w2; y,> 2 m2; z,)
w,; w-2) 2 1(x2; i,lv,). 
where inequalities 1-3 hold for the following reasons:
2) the BCC is memoryless; 3) J -+ Xi -+ Y, is a Markov chain.
Since S, Zj, N,, K satisfy (6) and (7), the following inequalities are established from (42) and (43) 
OIr,s (R2+c)Z(X2;Y2).
Since (35) and (44)- (47) can be obtained for any E > 0, (ll)- (13) hold.
B. Lemma on Broadcast Channels
Before going to the details of the proof of the direct part of Theorem 1, we shall establish a lemma concerning broadcast channels. Let us consider a system with a memoryless BCC P(yzlX) in Fig. 3 from the sender to the receiver 1. W, must be kept secret from the receiver 2, who is an eavesdropper, while W, may not be kept secret. W, and W, are independent of each other and taking values over ZM1 and ZiM,, respectively. If for any given E > 0 and sufficiently large n there exists a code (g, #) such that llogM-jk RJ* -e, j=1,2
p;,&t Y") # 0% w,wl~ w2) 5 E, (54 (R:, Rz) is said to be admissible for the system shown in Fig. 3 . Then the following lemma holds. Lemma I: Let P(x) be an arbitrary probability distribution over X. If
R; I I( X; Z), (54) then (RP, R; ) is admissible for the system shown in Fig. 3 .
Lemma 1 is proved in the Appendix. This lemma means that W, and W, can be transmitted to the receiver 1 at rate I( X, Y) -I( X, Z) and I( X, Z), respectively, with an arbitrarily small error. Furthermore, W, can be kept entirely secret from the receiver 2.
C. Proof of the Direct Part of Theorem 1 Let h,, h,, R,, and R, satisfy (ll)-(13) for some RV's Xj, 5, Zj and constants rj (j = 1,2). Then we must show that a code (f, +) exists that satisfies (6)-(8). Let rj be the constant that satisfies the right inequality in (11) with equality. Since r/ 2 rj, the following inequalities hold:
hj -r, 7 5 I( Xj; k;.) -I( xj; zj) J (55)
Furthermore, let h( be the constant that satisfies (55) 
Kr.' -$-= I( xj; r,).
We now construct a code by applying a typical sequence technique for the RV's Xj, 5, Zj satisfying (59) (8) bits.
(For simplicity, we consider these bits as integers because they can be approximated by integers with any desired accuracy for sufficiently large K.) Let T be a uniform random number having K [r[ + r-2' -H(S) -cK] bits and independent of S. These a, and T are divided into (a,, a=, a,$T) and (T, ad, aS) to be transmitted via BCCl and BCC2, respectively, where $ represents bitwise modulo-two sum.
Since (a,, a=, a,@T) is coded with codeword length N,, the rates of a2 and (a,, a,$T) are given by E(h;-r;)=Z(X,;Y,)-Z(X,;Z,)
1 E(h;-r{)=Z(X,;Y,)-Z(X,;Z,)
2 E(r;(h;-r;)) =Z(T2;Z2), respectively. Hence a4 and (T, as) can be transmitted to the legitimate receiver with an arbitrarily small error, and a4 can be kept entirely secret from the eavesdropper 2. Since the legitimate receiver can obtain a,, a2, a,@ T, T, ad, as, it can then reproduce S E Ys with an arbitrarily small error. This means that (8) holds.
Eavesdropper 1 may obtain al and a,@T. However, since T is an independent uniform random number, the eavesdropper can know only a, having K [ H( S) + cK -hi] bits. Therefore, from the equiprobability of the typical sequences (see (62)) the following inequality holds:
where fk, <;; -+ 0 (K -+ cc). Similarly, for eavesdropper 2 we have
From (58), (68), and (69) we can obtain (6) and (7). Hence, (Rl, R, , hl, h2 ) E ~sscs.
IV. AN EXAMPLE OF THE SSCS WITH BINARY BROADCAST CHANNELS
Let us consider a binary example. Let each BCC be constructed by three binary symmetric channels (BSC's) as shown in Fig. 6 , where the bit error probability Pjt (t = 1,2,3 and j = 1,2) is restricted to 0 I Pit IO.5
Pj2 I Pj3 (70) because the main channel is assumed to be less noisy than the wiretapped channel. respectively (because of (59) and (60)). Therefore, from 
where a*b=a(l-b)+(l-a)b and h(x)=-xlogx-(1 -x)log(l -x). To maximize the region given by (14)- (16), we have to obtain the optimum qj such that both (71) and (72) are maximized. Equation (71) is clearly maximized at qj = 0.5. Equation (72) is also maximized at qj = 0.5 because h(qj*pj~*pj~)~h(qj*pjI*Pj~) 
aj=l-h(Pjl* Pj2)
bj=h(Pj,* Pj3)-h(Pjl* Pj2).
